From Threat to Action: Donald Trump’s Bold Move – Signing EO ‘Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba’ (Effective Jan. 30, 2026) to Declare Emergency, Accuse Regime of Malign Activities and Hostile Alliances, and Authorize Potential Ad Valorem Duties on Any Nation’s Exports to the U.S. If They Continue Oil Deliveries to Havana, Seen as the Toughest Step Yet to Economically Strangle Cuba and Disrupt Its Energy Dependence
On January 29, 2026, President Donald J. Trump signed an executive order titled “Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba,” set to take effect at 12:01 a.m. Eastern Time on January 30. The order formally declares a national emergency related to Cuba, asserting that actions by its communist government constitute an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security and foreign policy.
The directive authorizes the U.S. government to consider imposing additional ad valorem tariffs on imports from any country that directly or indirectly supplies oil to Cuba. While no tariffs take effect automatically, the framework represents one of the most aggressive opening foreign-policy actions of Trump’s second term, aiming squarely at Cuba’s most critical vulnerability: its dependence on external energy supplies.
Historical Context: Decades of U.S.–Cuba Hostility
Relations between Washington and Havana have been adversarial since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, when Fidel Castro seized power, nationalized U.S.-owned assets, and aligned the country with the Soviet Union. In response, the United States imposed a sweeping economic embargo in the early 1960s—one that has endured, in varying forms, for more than six decades.
A brief thaw occurred during the Obama administration, when Barack Obama moved to restore diplomatic relations and ease travel and commercial restrictions between 2014 and 2016. Those measures were largely reversed during Trump’s first term, as sanctions were tightened over human rights concerns and Cuba’s backing of Venezuela’s government. Trump’s return to office in January 2025 has marked a renewed hardline posture, with the administration signaling that rapprochement is no longer on the table absent dramatic political change in Havana.
Energy, Migration, and Strategic Pressure
Cuba’s economic situation has deteriorated sharply in recent years. The long-standing embargo, the collapse of tourism during the COVID-19 pandemic, structural mismanagement, and external shocks have combined to create chronic shortages of fuel, food, and medicine. These pressures have triggered prolonged blackouts, sporadic protests—notably in 2021—and a mass exodus. From 2022 through 2024, more than 600,000 Cubans were encountered at the U.S. border, underscoring the regional implications of the island’s instability.
Energy remains the regime’s lifeline. For years, Cuba depended heavily on subsidized oil from Venezuela in exchange for medical and technical services. At its height, this arrangement provided roughly 100,000 barrels per day. By late 2025, however, shipments had fallen to around 30,000 barrels per day as Venezuela’s own production collapsed. Smaller, irregular supplies came from Russia and Algeria, but by 2025 Mexico emerged as the largest supplier, accounting for roughly 40–45 percent of Cuba’s oil imports.
The Role of Trump’s Second-Term Strategy
In Trump’s second term, senior officials have pushed a “maximum pressure” strategy designed to force concessions—or even regime change. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a longtime advocate of tough measures against Havana, has argued that Cuba’s survival is closely linked to regional authoritarian networks. He has publicly tied the administration’s Cuba policy to events in Venezuela, particularly the January 2026 U.S.-backed operation that resulted in the capture of former Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, disrupting oil-for-services arrangements that had benefited Havana for years.
The new executive order fits squarely into this strategy, seeking to cut off remaining energy flows by threatening third countries rather than Cuba itself, which is already comprehensively sanctioned.
What the Executive Order Does
The order invokes the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the National Emergencies Act, granting the president broad authority to impose economic measures during declared emergencies. It accuses the Cuban government of:
- Supporting and cooperating with hostile foreign actors, including Russia, China, and Iran
- Hosting intelligence and espionage activities that threaten U.S. security
- Contributing to regional instability through migration pressures and alleged malign activities
Its central mechanism is a secondary-sanctions-style approach. Rather than imposing new penalties directly on Cuba, the order establishes a process to levy additional tariffs on imports from countries that supply Cuba with crude oil or refined petroleum products.
Under the framework:
- The Secretary of Commerce identifies countries providing oil to Cuba.
- The Secretary of State, in coordination with Commerce, Treasury, USTR, and DHS, evaluates national security risks and recommends tariff levels.
- The president retains final authority over whether tariffs are imposed, adjusted, or rescinded.
The administration emphasized that the order creates a legal structure—not an automatic penalty—and can be modified if conditions change.
Likely Targets and Immediate Effects
Mexico is widely viewed as the primary country at risk. President Claudia Sheinbaum sharply criticized the move, warning it could worsen humanitarian conditions in Cuba by deepening blackouts and shortages. She framed Mexican oil shipments as humanitarian in nature and reaffirmed Mexico’s right to make sovereign foreign policy decisions. Reports following the order suggest that some shipments were temporarily paused as Mexico weighed diplomatic options and trade considerations with the United States.
Russia may also be affected, though its oil deliveries to Cuba have been smaller and inconsistent. Other suppliers, such as Algeria, are considered less likely targets due to limited trade exposure to the U.S. market.
For Cuba itself, the implications are severe. Fuel shortages already result in power outages lasting more than 20 hours a day in some regions, crippling transportation, agriculture, and industry. Analysts warn that further supply disruptions could intensify public hardship and unrest, even as U.S. officials argue the pressure is necessary to counter hostile influence and protect national security.
Reactions at Home and Abroad
Hardline U.S. lawmakers, including Cuban-American representatives such as Carlos Giménez, praised the order as a long-overdue strike at the Cuban regime’s vulnerabilities. Rubio and others framed it as part of a broader hemispheric strategy following developments in Venezuela.
In Havana, President Miguel Díaz-Canel condemned the order in stark terms, calling it “criminal” and accusing Washington of attempting a total fuel blockade under false pretenses. Cuban state media characterized the move as economic warfare and vowed resistance.
Internationally, left-leaning parties and solidarity organizations denounced the escalation as a deepening of the decades-long blockade, while some analysts described it as an extension of Trump’s assertive interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine—aimed at limiting Russian and Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere. Trade and legal experts, meanwhile, cautioned that the order is procedural and that businesses should monitor future designations closely.
Broader Implications
The executive order reflects Trump’s broader “America First” doctrine: using tariffs and economic pressure as tools of national security. It mirrors earlier secondary sanctions on Iranian and Venezuelan oil buyers and signals that third countries risk economic consequences for supporting sanctioned regimes.
However, the strategy carries risks. It could strain relations with Mexico, a key U.S. trading partner under USMCA, exacerbate humanitarian suffering in Cuba, and potentially increase migration flows toward the United States. Critics also question its effectiveness, noting that Cuba has survived six decades of sanctions with limited political change.
As of early February 2026, no specific tariffs have been announced. Whether the order becomes a powerful enforcement tool or remains largely symbolic will depend on follow-through by U.S. agencies and how Cuba—and its remaining partners—respond. What is clear is that the move signals a rapid and forceful reshaping of U.S. policy toward Cuba at the outset of Trump’s second term.
